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INTRODUCTION
The price of oil worldwide soared to record new levels in 2008. 1
Fueled in large part by unprecedented demand in emerging market
countries, the spectacular rise in prices led to a series of damaging
aftershocks in other sectors. 2 The growing unease among consumers,
policymakers, and energy producers resulted in a wide range of
urgent proposals to review and reform the global oil trade. 3
One consequence of the spike in prices was renewed calls by
1. See Catherine Boyle, Fuel Woes Deepen As Oil Nears $140 Record High,
TIMES ONLINE, June 16, 2008, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/
industry_sectors/natural_resources/article4149483.ece (reporting that the price of
crude oil hit a record high point of $139.89 a barrel, surpassing the previous high
of $139.12 set only twelve days earlier on June 6, 2008).
2. See June 2008 Release, SHORT-TERM ENERGY OUTLOOK (Energy Info.
Admin., Washington, D.C.) June 10, 2008, at 2, available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/steo/pub/jun08.pdf (evaluating the overall state of
the global oil market and forecasting developing trends, including rising
consumption rates in China, India, and other countries experiencing rapid growth);
see also Steven Mufson, This Time, It’s Different: Global Pressures Have
Converged to Forge a New Oil Reality, WASH. POST, July 27, 2008, at A1
(examining factors which today are contributing to oil demand levels outpacing
supply, including a long period of low-to-moderate oil prices in recent years that
contributed to the popularity of fuel-inefficient vehicles in the United States and
the rapid growth of the Chinese economy); Adam Shell, Could Cub Grow Into A
Grizzly Bear Market?, USA TODAY, July 6, 2008, at 1B (discussing the significant
recent decline in stock prices, caused in part by rising oil prices, and the likelihood
of a long-term downturn in stock prices). See generally High oil prices hit global
economies, BBC NEWS, May 28, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/
7421778.stm (reporting the effects of increased oil prices in different areas around
the world, including rising food prices, greater emphasis on conservation and
alternative energies, and an overall fear of economic fallout).
3. See generally Susan L. Sakmar, Bringing Energy Trade into the WTO: The
Historical Context, Current Status and Potential Implications for the Middle East
Region, 18 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 89 (2008) (discussing the current
geopolitical environment surrounding the oil trade and recent demand by energy
consumers for freer trade in energy services to alleviate price fluctuation and
promote stability in energy markets).
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members of Congress and the major 2008 Presidential campaigns in
the United States to initiate dispute settlement proceedings against
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (“OPEC”) 4 at the
World Trade Organization (“WTO”). 5 Proponents of this notion
capitalize on a popular perception within the United States of OPEC
as a sinister cartel that never misses an opportunity to profit off
economic calamity, and contend that OPEC’s activities are a major
cause of skyrocketing gas prices. 6 They argue that a decision from
the WTO against OPEC’s actions would allow the imposition of
trade remedies against oil exporting nations and ultimately reduce
the price of oil for consumers. 7
This Comment explores the viability of these proposals. Part I of
this Comment describes the OPEC practices that form the basis of
opponents’ complaints, including OPEC member countries’ efforts to
influence the world oil market and help oil producers achieve certain
rates of return, as well as the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 8 (“GATT”) provisions under which such conduct is called into

4. Agreement Concerning the Creation of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries, Sept. 14, 1960, 443 U.N.T.S. 247.
5. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154; see Press Release, Senator Frank R. Lautenberg,
Lautenberg Introduces Bill To Take Action Against OPEC (May 5, 2008),
http://lautenberg.senate.gov/newsroom/record.cfm?id=297216 (announcing the
introduction of Senator Lautenberg’s legislation requiring action against OPEC for
“its anti-competitive practices and illegal export quotas on oil, which ultimately
lead to higher gas prices here at home”).
6. See Andrew C. Udin, Slaying Goliath: The Extraterritorial Application of
U.S. Antitrust Law to OPEC, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1321, 1324 (arguing that the
consistent result of OPEC’s policies is to force American consumers to pay higher
prices for gasoline in order to greatly increase OPEC’s profits); Spencer Weber
Waller, Suing OPEC, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 105, 106 (2002) (describing the public
perception of OPEC within the United States as a “greedy, rapacious international
cartel that preys on the American public”); see also OPEC Accountability Act, S.
2976, 110th Cong. § 2 (2008) (including in its findings that OPEC “has formed a
cartel and engaged in anticompetitive practices to manipulate the price of oil,
keeping it artificially high”).
7. See Press Release, Senator Frank R. Lautenberg, Senators Call on Bush to
Take Action Against OPEC in the WTO (June 17, 2008), http://lautenberg.senate.
gov/newsroom/record.cfm?id=299257 (accusing OPEC of manipulating the oil
market, thereby causing radically increased gas prices).
8. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the WTO, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153;
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter referred to collectively as GATT]. The 1994 and 1947 agreements
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question. 9 Part II.A finds OPEC’s practices in violation of the GATT
Article XI prohibition on quantitative export restrictions. 10 Part II.B
contemplates a justification for OPEC’s tactics as a legitimate
general exception under the GATT Article XX(g). 11 Part III counsels
against challenging OPEC’s practices at the WTO, and proposes the
creation of a new multilateral energy trading framework that better
serves the divergent goals of OPEC and the WTO. 12 This comment
concludes that proposals to initiate WTO dispute settlement against
OPEC member countries should be avoided not only because they
are likely to be ineffective, but also because preferable alternatives
exist for reforming the global energy trade. 13

I. BACKGROUND
OPEC and the WTO are international organizations conceived
with radically different goals and purposes. 14 The WTO is primarily

are referred to collectively because the 1994 incorporates many aspects of the 1947
agreement and supersedes any conflicts.
9. See infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text (discussing the GATT Article
XI, which prohibits WTO member countries from imposing quantitative export
restrictions, including quotas).
10. GATT, supra note 8, art. XI (requiring the general elimination of
qualitative restrictions); see infra notes 53–77 and accompanying text (arguing that
while OPEC’s methods are production quotas and not export restrictions, they
nonetheless constitute a violation of the GATT Article XI).
11. GATT, supra note 8, art. XX(g) (providing general exceptions for
measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources); see infra
notes 78–109 and accompanying text (interpreting the language of Article XX(g)
and existing precedent as permissive of the production quotas on oil set by OPEC
member countries).
12. See infra notes 110–34 and accompanying text (recommending a new
system for incorporating the energy trade within the WTO framework that seeks to
achieve market stability, energy conservation, and economic development for oil
exporting nations).
13. See infra notes 135–37 and accompanying text (concluding that WTO
dispute resolution should not be initiated against OPEC because a WTO panel is
likely to find OPEC’s policies consistent with its obligations under the GATT, and
therefore dispute resolution would not achieve the results sought by countries
opposed to OPEC’s activities in the global oil market).
14. See Melaku Geboye Desta, The Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries, the World Trade Organization, and Regional Trade Agreements, 37 J.
WORLD TRADE 523, 523 (2003) (describing OPEC and the WTO as two
“diametrically opposed” organizations: the WTO is focused heavily on market
liberalization and access, while OPEC is focused equally closely on
intergovernmental manipulation of prices).
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a negotiating forum conceived to administer the GATT, which was
negotiated in the immediate aftermath of World War II with the
intention of reducing market access barriers and easing the flow of
goods in international trade. 15 Still reeling from the destruction of
World War II, the creators of the GATT hoped that a far-reaching
open markets policy would eliminate the economic tensions that at
times led to armed conflict. 16 OPEC, conversely, was created
specifically to strengthen its member countries’ control over the
trade of their exports, and ultimately to influence the price of oil in
the global market. 17 As the two organizations grew and the economic
landscape developed over the years, their power expanded while the
economic interests of their respective member countries evolved. 18
Today nine of the thirteen OPEC member countries have joined the
WTO in the hope of maximizing their potential for economic growth
through the WTO’s framework of liberalized international trade. 19
The dual membership these nine countries enjoy raises the question

15. See generally MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 25 (3d ed. 2005) (explaining the basic
elements of the GATT/WTO structure, including the overall requirement for
member countries to reduce trade barriers under the GATT, and methods of
resolving disputes among WTO members).
16. See John H. Jackson, The WTO ‘Constitution’ and Proposed Reforms:
Seven ‘Mantras’ Revisited, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 67, 68 (2001) (identifying a
primary objective of the GATT founders in the aftermath of World War II as
avoiding another war by reducing the economic conditions that were seen as
evocative of conflict).
17. See Desta, supra note 14, at 549 (describing OPEC as a rare example of a
successful cartel that exists to control the total oil output of member countries).
18. See generally Sakmar, supra note 3 (exploring the current economic state
of oil exporting nations and finding slow levels of growth that indicate a common
need among these nations to increase trade capacity in the hopes of spurring
development and offsetting possible economic losses as global demand for oil
declines in the future).
19. Cf. WTO, Understanding the WTO: The Organization – Members and
Observers, http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last
visited Jan. 10, 2009) [hereinafter The Organization – Members and Observers]
(listing current members of the WTO — currently OPEC members that are also
members of the WTO are Angola, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kuwait, Nigeria, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, UAE and Venezuela); The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries, Brief History, http://www.opec.org/aboutus/history/history.htm (last
visited Feb. 27, 2009) [hereinafter OPEC Brief History] (listing current OPEC
countries).
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of whether in fact countries can successfully fulfill their divergent
obligations to each organization. 20

A. OPEC: ITS FOUNDING, GOALS AND METHODS
OPEC was created in 1960 by representatives of five of the
world’s leading oil producing nations at a conference in Baghdad. 21
Its founding was devised, in part, as a counter to concurrent efforts
by the United States to limit foreign competition for its own
domestic oil producers. 22 At its inception, the goal of OPEC’s
founding members was to protect the collective bargaining power of
oil producing nations from protectionism and the coordinated
operations of the world’s largest oil corporations. 23 Today, with
thirteen members, its goals remain much the same: to coordinate the
oil production policies of member countries in order to guarantee

20. See Stephen A. Broome, Note, Conflicting Obligations for Oil Exporting
Nations?: Satisfying Membership Requirements of Both OPEC and the WTO, 38
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 409, 411 (2006) (noting that “congressional efforts to
challenge OPEC focus on OPEC’s alleged inconsistency with the WTO”). See
generally OFFICE OF SENATOR FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, BUSTING UP THE CARTEL:
THE WTO CASE AGAINST OPEC (2004), available at http://lautenberg.senate.gov/
documents/foreign/OPEC%20Memo.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2009) [hereinafter
LAUTENBERG REPORT] (arguing that OPEC is violating its GATT/WTO
obligations and that none of the exceptions apply).
21. See OPEC Brief History, supra note 19 (summarizing the history of OPEC
from its inception by the five founding member countries of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, to its current roster of thirteen member countries,
including the five founding parties and Qatar, Indonesia, Libya, United Arab
Emirates (“UAE”), Algeria, Nigeria, Ecuador, and Angola (Gabon joined OPEC in
1975 and withdrew from membership in 1994)).
22. See Jeffrey P. Bialos, Oil Imports and National Security: The Legal and
Policy Framework for Ensuring United States Access to Strategic Resources, 11 U.
PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 235, 245 (1989) (describing the establishment by President
Eisenhower in 1959 of the Mandatory Oil Import Program, which imposed strict
import restrictions on foreign oil into the United States, and theorizing that such
restrictions, and their impact on oil prices worldwide, spurred the creation of
OPEC as a counterweight to U.S. policies in the oil market).
23. See Edward Quill, The Failure of International Commodity Agreements:
Forms, Functions, and Implications, 22 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 503, 509
(1994) (describing the central factors leading to the creation of OPEC, including
the weakened bargaining position of the world’s leading oil corporations due to the
introduction of several independent national oil companies, and the drastic price
cuts resulting from increased international market competition and protectionist
import restrictions in the United States).
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their individual and collective best interests — the most important of
which is maintaining an appropriately high price for oil. 24
OPEC achieves its goals by discouraging competition among its
members for market share and by determining target oil prices,
which are achieved through coordinated supply control measures,
including quotas on oil production. 25 This coordination is at the root
of the common conception of OPEC as a hydrocarbon “cartel,” a
characterization that carries a range of pejorative connotations. 26 In
the United States the negative public perception of OPEC has
triggered a number of unsuccessful attempts to use the courts and
U.S. antitrust laws to force OPEC to abandon its policies. 27
24. See OPEC, OPEC Statute, approved Jan. 1, 1961, art. 2(A), available at
http://www.opec.org/library/opec%20statute/pdf/os.pdf [hereinafter OPEC Statute]
(identifying the principle aim of the organization as the coordination and
unification of petroleum policies of member countries and the determination of the
best means for safeguarding their interests, individually and collectively); see also
Broome, supra note 20, at 414 (studying OPEC member countries policies in
relation to their WTO obligations, and concluding without a doubt that OPEC
measures are designed to control the oil supply on the world market). But see
Quill, supra note 23, at 512-13 (commenting on the difficulties OPEC faces in
overcoming differences of opinions on policy objectives among its members).
25. See Energy Info. Admin., OPEC Brief (Nov. 26, 2004),
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/opec.pdf (describing how OPEC collects
market price data on several varieties of crude oils produced around the world and
then averages these prices to create an OPEC reference price representing world oil
market conditions, which they in turn use to manipulate oil production levels to
achieve a target price); see also OPEC, Why Does OPEC Set Oil Production
Quotas?, http://www.opec.org/library/FAQs/aboutOPEC/q12.htm (last visited Jan.
13, 2009) (explaining that oil production regulations are one possible tactic
employed by OPEC member countries to achieve “stability and harmony in the
petroleum market for the benefit of both oil producers and consumers”). See
generally Desta, supra note 14, at 536 (describing OPEC’s supply restriction
measures as normally triggered when oil prices decline below certain levels).
26. See Desta, supra note 14, at 547-49 (describing OPEC as clearly an intergovernmental cartel and acknowledging the negative connotations such a term
entails, but denying any impropriety in the functioning of OPEC as a cartel
because there is no prevailing international law nor consistent principle or practice
of major trading nations, where collusion to manage the pace of exploitation of
natural resources is neither unusual nor discouraged).
27. See, e.g., Prewitt Enter., Inc. v. OPEC, 353 F.3d 916, 918-19 (11th Cir.
2003) (dismissing the suit for lack of jurisdiction—and thus an insufficient service
of process—and holding that there were no means available for service upon
OPEC in an action alleging violation of the Sherman Act and seeking equitable
relief pursuant to the Clayton Act); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that act of state
doctrine barred federal court jurisdiction in an action by complainants seeking
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Frustrated by the courts’ failures, and eager to reap political gain
from the public’s distrust of OPEC, Congress has interjected itself
with legislation aimed at facilitating future court challenges to
OPEC’s position. 28 However, in the absence of a new legal challenge
against OPEC, some in Congress have looked to other means of
sanctioning OPEC, including WTO dispute resolution. 29

B. THE GATT/WTO FRAMEWORK
The current multilateral trading system overseen by the WTO was
established in 1947 with the enactment of the GATT. 30 The GATT
seeks to improve worldwide economic growth by reducing domestic
market access barriers and promoting free trade. 31 Today the WTO
includes 153 member countries that are bound by the terms of the
GATT. 32
monetary and injunctive relief for alleged price fixing of crude oil prices in
violation of Sherman Act).
28. See, e.g., Gas Price Relief for Consumers Act of 2008, H.R. 6074, 110th
Cong. (2008) (attempting to amend the Sherman Act to make it illegal for foreign
states to act collectively to limit the production of oil, set the price for oil, or
otherwise restrain the oil trade, and removing a court’s ability to decide a case
based on the act of state doctrine); No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels
(NOPEC) Act of 2007, H.R. 2264, 110th Cong. (2007) (proposing the elimination
of protection of OPEC from provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act);
see also Broome, supra note 20, at 410 (finding that Congress perceived
substantial difficulty in bringing an effective antitrust suit against OPEC, and thus
sought to eliminate certain defenses and immunities thought to be a barrier to
effective litigation).
29. See, e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 276, 106th Cong. (2000) (urging the President of
the United States to file a complaint in the WTO against oil-producing nations for
violating their obligations under WTO rules).
30. See Jackson, supra note 16, at 68 (discussing the circumstances that led to
the negotiation of the GATT and the negotiators’ goals of eliminating the threat of
future armed conflict, and increasing worldwide economic opportunity by reducing
barriers to economic trade).
31. See id. at 68-69 (describing the history of the GATT/WTO multilateral
trading system and its underlying policy goals, including the mutual economic
betterment of all nations, and an effective system for peacefully resolving
international economic disputes). See generally WTO, Understanding the WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/whatis_e/tif_e/tif_e.htm (last visited Jan.
13, 2009) (providing a general overview of the WTO, including its policy goals
and objectives, and its methods of achieving results).
32. See The Organization – Members and Observers, supra note 19 (listing the
members of the WTO as of July 23, 2008, and providing individual information on
trade statistics, WTO commitments, disputes, trade policy reviews, and
notifications); see also WTO, Understanding the WTO: The Organization –
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The GATT commits its members to “reciprocal and mutually
advantageous arrangements” designed to reduce trade barriers and
discriminatory treatment in international commerce. 33 Originally, the
GATT intended to curtail the most onerous border restrictions on
trade, leaving any remaining restrictions in the form of tariffs to be
negotiated down over time. 34 To that end, Article XI of the GATT
provides for the elimination of restrictions on imports or exports,
other than duties, taxes or other charges, regardless of whether such
restrictions are effectuated through quotas, import or export licenses,
or other measures. 35
The GATT includes a number of specific exceptions to Article XI,
including exceptions for nations facing serious financial problems
and exceptions for restrictions to support infant industries in
developing nations. 36 In addition to these and other specific
Membership, alliances and bureaucracy, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
whatis_e/tif_e/org3_e.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2009) (describing the four general
stages of accession to the WTO: disclosure of all aspects of a country’s trade and
economic policies, determination of what mutually-beneficial terms the
prospective member country has to offer, the drafting of a membership treaty, and
the ultimate approval of agreement protocols).
33. See GATT, supra note 8, pmbl. (declaring mutual findings of the parties to
the agreement, including the need to raise standards of living, ensure the optimal
use of natural resources and promote the sustainable development, and resolving to
develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system); see
also TREBILCOCK, supra note 15, at 25-39 (describing the basic elements of the
GATT/WTO and providing a general roadmap to its rules and regulations,
including the principle of non-discrimination among member countries, the Most
Favoured Nation (MFN) principle, National Treatment principle, quantitative
restrictions and certain remedies).
34. See TREBILCOCK, supra note 15, at 29-30 (explaining the goal of the GATT
Article XI prohibition on the use of import or export quotas, and the underlying
theory that restrictions on quantitative controls would increase transparency and
commensurability of tariffs and help speed their reduction over time).
35. GATT, supra note 8, art. XI; see Broome, supra note 20, at 412-13
(analyzing the language of Article XI and considering whether OPEC’s measures
restricting oil production are properly characterized as violating the GATT rules
against quantitative restrictions on exports because OPEC’s measures consist of
production quotas and not government-imposed export restrictions).
36. See GATT, supra note 8, art. XII (providing restrictions on the applicability
of Article XI’s provisions in order to protect nations with serious balance of
payments problems, as such measures are required to safeguard their financial
position); see also id. art. XVIII (allowing states to violate Article XI if necessary
to enact protective measures designed to raise the standard of living of their
people, so long as those measures facilitate the attainment of the overall objectives
of the GATT); see generally TREBILCOCK, supra note 15, at 30 (explaining briefly
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exceptions to the provisions of Article XI, Article XX provides a
number of general exceptions, or dispensations from the GATT
obligations when necessary under certain conditions. 37 Included
among them is the GATT Article XX(g), which explicitly provides a
general exception for measures relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources. 38
If a nation challenges another country’s actions, these disputes are
resolved under the GATT/WTO framework by the Dispute
Settlement Body (“DSB”). 39 If a complaint cannot be resolved
through obligatory consultations between parties, the complaint is
referred to the DSB, which appoints a panel to investigate the
complaint and make recommendations to the DSB for resolution of
the dispute. 40 For this function, the DSB is comprised of
representatives from all WTO member countries and issues decisions
by consensus. 41
several exceptions to Article XI, including those contained in Articles XII and
XVIII, and the rise of so-called “New Protectionism,” which entails the use of
quantitative restrictions negotiated on a bilateral basis under threat of unilateral
actions).
37. See GATT, supra note 8, art. XX (providing for a number of general
exceptions to member states’ obligations under the GATT, so long as such
measures are not applied in a manner that would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail,
or a disguised restriction on international trade). Article XX includes a list of ten
general exceptions for measures related to the protection of public morals, public
health, the exploitation of prison labor, and the import and export of gold and
silver. Id.
38. Id. art. XX(g) (allowing countries to take action to conserve exhaustible
natural resources so long as similar measures are taken domestically as well); see
also TREBILCOCK, supra note 15, at 334 (discussing the implications and intent of
the GATT Article XX on the exploitation of natural resources and the
environment, noting that the word “environment” does not appear in the text of
Article XX, and speculating that the purpose of Article XX(g) might be to permit
member countries to protect exhaustible natural resources such as petroleum).
39. See GATT, supra note 8, Annex 2, Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art. 2(1) (establishing the Dispute
Settlement Body (“DSB”) and granting it authority to “monitor implementation of
panel and Appellate Body reports, maintain surveillance of implementation of
rulings and recommendations, and authorize suspension of concessions and other
obligations under the covered agreements”).
40. See id. art. XXII (requiring consultation between parties should complaints
arise regarding the operation of the GATT); id. Annex 2 art. 6 (authorizing the
establishment of panels to investigate complaints between member countries).
41. See WTO, Dispute Settlement, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/dispu_e.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2008) (noting that since the member
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C. THE WTO CASE AGAINST OPEC
Using WTO’s dispute settlement framework as a forum to attack
OPEC’s interventionist policies in the oil market appeals to OPEC’s
opponents because of the seemingly obvious divergence between the
stated goals of the two organizations. 42 OPEC candidly seeks to limit
membership to countries with substantial crude petroleum exports
and “fundamentally similar interests” in order to ensure that its
policies are closely aligned with the best interests of its
membership. 43 The preamble of the WTO agreement, conversely,
lists among its goals the reduction of tariffs, barriers to trade, and
discriminatory treatment among members and trading partners. 44
Rather than restricting membership to meet specific criteria, the
WTO agreement allows for membership (accession) by any State,
provided only that the State’s external commercial relations are
autonomous. 45
In 2004 Senator Frank Lautenberg released a report entitled
Busting Up the Cartel: The WTO Case Against OPEC, which
proposed initiating dispute resolution against those OPEC member
countries that are also members of the WTO and thus bound to the
provisions of the GATT. 46 In addition to the report, Senator
states authored the agreements, they are the ones enforcing them through the
DSB); see also TREBILCOCK, supra note 15, at 36-37 (explaining the WTO dispute
resolution process, from members’ initial obligation to consult with one another
regarding complaints, to the possible involvement of the DSB and ultimate review
by the General Council).
42. See Desta, supra note 14, at 524-25 (contrasting the general qualities of
OPEC and WTO, two institutions that “at first sight” could not be further apart).
The WTO is committed to market liberalization and open to the accession of any
country or customs territory. Id. OPEC is strictly committed to ensuring a
favorable market for oil exports, and its membership remains open only to
countries that export substantial amounts of oil. Id.
43. See OPEC Statute, supra note 24, art. 7C (detailing the requirements for
membership in OPEC, which are based on the fundamental premise that
prospective members must meet narrow guidelines for crude oil exports and
common interests).
44. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 2 (1999), 1867 U.NT.S. 14, 33 I.L.M.
1143, 1144 (1994).
45. GATT, supra note 8, art. XII.
46. See LAUTENBERG REPORT, supra note 20, at 5-6, 12 (proposing that WTO
dispute settlement proceedings be initiated against OPEC member countries for
violating the GATT Article XI prohibition on quantitative export restrictions, and
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Lautenberg introduced the OPEC Accountability Act of 2008,
legislation that would require the U.S. government to pursue dispute
resolution against OPEC member countries at the WTO. 47 Although
this legislation was never enacted, Senator Lautenberg’s efforts
demonstrate his firm belief that WTO dispute settlement would
eliminate OPEC’s influence over oil markets. 48

II. ANALYSIS
OPEC’s system of oil production and price controls among its
member countries violates the GATT Article XI. 49 If challenged
however, a DSB panel would probably find such practices justified
under the GATT Article XX(g) General Exception for policies
relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. 50 Such a
finding would preserve Article XI’s effectiveness against market
access barriers, while allowing member countries to determine their

finding no justification for OPEC’s policies among the GATT specific exceptions
to Article XI, general exceptions under Article XX, or separate protections for
national security and developing nations).
47. See OPEC Accountability Act, S. 2976, 110th Cong. (2008) (requiring the
United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) to initiate consultations with
countries that are members of both OPEC and the WTO with the aims of forcing a
stop to OPEC’s market manipulation, and if consultations fail, requiring the USTR
to request a WTO dispute settlement panel to judge the case). The bill includes the
finding that the agreement among OPEC member nations to limit oil exports
violates the GATT Article XI prohibition on restrictions on the exportation or sale
for export of a product. Id. The bill also finds that OPEC export quotas cause high
prices that harm American families, “undermine the American economy, impede
American and foreign commerce, and are contrary to the national interests of the
United States.” Id.
48. See Govtrack.us, S. 2976: OPEC Accountability Act, http://www.govtrack.
us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-2976 (last visited Mar. 2, 2009); LAUTENBERG
REPORT, supra note 20, at 12 (concluding that WTO dispute settlement against
OPEC would increase oil supplies and, therefore, result in lower prices for
consumers).
49. See infra notes 53-77 and accompanying text (arguing that OPEC member
countries are in violation of Article XI because their coordinated limits on oil
production amount to substantive export controls under the broad terms of Article
XI and prior WTO panel precedent).
50. See infra notes 78-109 and accompanying text (suggesting that OPEC’s
policies likely fall under the GATT Article XX(g) General Exception for
exhaustible natural resources because recent WTO actions have indicated a trend
toward greater deference to measures aimed at environmental protection and
because there is established precedent at the WTO of a panel considering
petroleum an exhaustible natural resource covered under Article XX(g)).
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own domestic policies for exploitation of exhaustible natural
resources. 51

A. OPEC’S PRACTICES VIOLATE GATT ARTICLE XI
The primary question in a challenge to OPEC’s policies at the
WTO is whether OPEC’s activities are “prohibitions or restrictions”
on exports barred under Article XI. 52 OPEC is straightforward in its
efforts to influence the global supply of oil through a system of
production and pricing controls, but it does not directly restrict
exports. 53 Because the GATT does not specifically identify
production and pricing controls as prohibited means of limiting
exports, whether OPEC’s use of these controls violates Article XI
remains an open question. 54
The Lautenberg Report and its companion legislation conclude
that OPEC’s agreement to limit oil production represents a
quantitative restriction under Article XI. 55 The report considers the
export-restrictive activities of OPEC member countries as
fundamentally inconsistent with WTO obligations, which are
deliberately broad under Article XI. 56 This conclusion is plausible,
51. See Desta, supra note 14, at 537-38.
52. See Broome, supra note 20, at 413 (referring to assertions made in the
Lautenberg Report that OPEC’s measures restricting oil production violate the
GATT Article XI, and arguing that it is not clear that measures taken to restrict oil
production “are properly characterized as export restrictions” under the GATT
because they affect the production of the commodity itself, and not its export). But
see Desta, supra note 14, at 533-34 (noting that the GATT case-law has
established that the use of price setting techniques similar to those used by OPEC
falls under the restrictions in Article XI, and arguing that it is possible a WTO
panel would conclude OPEC’s policies violate Article XI because they achieve the
effect of quantitative restrictions effected through minimum export price
requirements).
53. See Desta, supra note 14, at 526 (describing OPEC’s system of
discouraging competition between members and setting target prices for oil which
are implemented through “coordinated supply control measures”).
54. See Broome, supra note 20, at 413-14 (discussing the difference between
“production” and “export restrictions” and those concepts’ treatment under Article
XI).
55. See OPEC Accountability Act, S. 2976, 110th Cong. § 2(6) (2008);
LAUTENBERG REPORT, supra note 20, at 8 (finding OPEC’s practices in violation
of the GATT Article XI rules that prohibit quantitative export restrictions because
OPEC’s activities are export-restrictive and inconsistent with the terms of Article
XI).
56. See LAUTENBERG REPORT, supra note 20, at 8 (suggesting that the broad
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but not definitive, since the relevant GATT provisions do not
mention production controls. 57
There is precedent for the Lautenberg Report’s interpretation of
Article XI as a comprehensive prohibition on all measures designed
to limit exports, with the narrow exception of “duties, taxes, or other
charges.” 58 In Japan – Trade in Semi-Conductors, a GATT panel
considered whether administrative guidance alone by the
Government of Japan over its semiconductor manufacturing sector
was inconsistent with the provisions of Article XI. 59 In that case,
Japan instituted a monitoring regime over its semiconductor industry
in order to prevent dumping of semiconductor products at prices
below manufacturing costs, in accordance with the 1986
Arrangement Concerning Trade in Semi-Conductor Products
between Japan and the United States. 60 Under the regime’s
guidelines, the Japanese government collected data from the nation’s
semiconductor industry on costs and expenditures related to the
manufacture and export of semiconductor products. 61 The

wording of Article XI indicates that it covers any measure maintained by a WTO
member that restricts exportation).
57. See GATT, supra note 8, art. XI (denouncing “prohibitions or restrictions
other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quotas,
import or export licenses or other measures,” but making no specific reference to
controls on the production of goods for export).
58. Report of the Panel, Japan – Trade in Semi-Conductors, ¶ 132, L/6309
(May 4, 1988), GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 116, 162 (1989) [hereinafter Japan
– Trade in Semi-Conductors] (considering Japan’s implementation of a treaty
provision entered into with the United States, in response to a complaint filed by
the European Economic Community (“EEC”), and finding that Japan's method of
implementing the provision to monitor the manufacturing sector’s export practices
constituted a “coherent system” that restricted Japanese exports and that this
system violated article XI of the GATT).
59. Id. ¶ 49 (introducing the main arguments of the parties to the dispute,
including the EEC’s contention that Japan’s monitoring regime had the effect of
setting price controls on exports in violation of the GATT Article XI).
60. Arrangement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the
United States of America Concerning Trade in Semiconductor Products, Nov. 6,
1986, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1408 (1986) (taking steps to address concerns among
the U.S. semiconductor industry of Japanese manufacturers dumping
semiconductor products on foreign markets at artificially low prices, including
requiring the Japanese government to monitor exports by its semiconductor
industry to ensure no anticompetitive dumping practices take place).
61. See Japan – Trade in Semi-Conductors, supra note 58, ¶¶ 19-27
(describing the scope and practice of the Japanese monitoring regime at the center
of the dispute, which involved Japanese government officials reviewing the price
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government then analyzed the data and, in cases in which “exports
were made at prices ‘extremely lower’ than the [production] cost[s],”
Japan would communicate the concerns about dumping to the
manufacturer. 62 The European Economic Community (“EEC”) 63
challenged the regime, alleging that the Japanese government’s
monitoring and subsequent requests to industry to modify production
schedules and rates constituted a violation of Article XI. 64 The EEC
claimed the Japanese monitoring regime interfered with the market
and consequently raised prices for semiconductor products. 65 Japan
insisted that its “monitoring was mere watching,” and furthermore,
that its communications to the industry were advisory only and not
legally binding. 66 Ultimately, the Japanese argued that its efforts
were only requests of manufacturers to align their production levels
to reflect “real demand” and prevent dumping, not to restrict
exports. 67

of semi-conductor exports and commenting when those prices were outside a
certain range).
62. Id. ¶ 36.
63. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (calling for a closer union among the nations of Europe to
encourage greater economic growth, accomplished through the establishment of a
customs union with a common external tariff and common policies for agriculture,
transport and trade).
64. See Japan – Trade in Semi-Conductors, supra note 58, ¶ 49 (alleging that
Japan’s efforts to monitor semi-conductor exports and advise manufacturers of
apparently anti-competitive policies were effectively export controls in violation of
the GATT Article XI).
65. See id. ¶¶ 34-35 (claiming that communications between government
officials and the semi-conductor industry were effectively interpreted as orders to
curtail exports at a certain price).
66. See id. ¶¶ 37-42 (detailing Japan’s argument that its practice was only to
monitor the semi-conductor trade, and when exports were made at prices
“extremely lower” than the costs, the Japanese government “might present the
facts and communicate its concern to the manufacturer”); id. ¶ 14 (describing the
framework of the Japan/U.S. arrangement in semi-conductor trade, the second
section of which required Japan to monitor, as appropriate, cost and export prices
on the products exported by Japanese semi-conductor firms to certain markets “in
order to prevent dumping”); see also Broome, supra note 20, at 415 (characterizing
the Japanese argument as based on the belief that the monitoring regime did not
constitute a “restriction” under Article XI).
67. See Japan – Trade in Semi-Conductors, supra note 58, ¶ 27 (explaining the
Japanese government’s objective was to emphasize to manufacturers the
importance of not producing more than buyers demanded and not to regulate or
encourage companies to conspire to allocate production volume, which would be a
violation of Japanese anti-trust laws).
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The GATT panel began its analysis by declaring unequivocally
that Article XI, unlike other GATT provisions, does not refer to laws
or regulations but to a broader class of measures, and further that the
article’s expansive wording was a clear indication that it covered any
measure restricting exports, or sales for export. 68 Furthermore, the
panel noted a previous decision that held that an import regulation
allowing the import of a product in principle, but not below a
minimum price level, constituted a restriction on imports within the
meaning of Article XI. 69 The central question for the panel in Japan
– Trade in Semi-Conductors was thus whether the same principle
applied to export restrictions based on market prices. 70 The panel
held that it did, and concluded that the Government of Japan had
created an administrative structure to effectively restrict the sale for
export of semiconductor products below a target price. 71 The
Japanese monitoring regime thus constituted a restriction on exports
inconsistent with Article XI. 72
Based on the Japan – Trade in Semi-Conductors precedent, a DSB
panel would likely find OPEC’s methods inconsistent with Article

68. Id. ¶ 106 (finding that Article XI unequivocally forbids any measures
instituted or maintained by a party to the GATT which restricts the exportation or
sale for export of products, regardless of whether the measures are legally binding
on those affected).
69. See Report of the Panel, EEC – Programme of Minimum Import Prices,
Licences and Surety Deposits for Certain Processed Fruits and Vegetables, ¶ 4.9,
L/4687 (Oct. 4, 1978), GATT B.I.S.D. (25th Supp.) at 68, 107 (1979) (examining a
United States complaint concerning the minimum import price for tomato
concentrates and the systems of licensing and surety deposits applied by the
European Community with respect to imports of certain processed fruits and
vegetables and finding such import restrictions inconsistent with the GATT Article
XI prohibition on export restrictions).
70. See Japan – Trade in Semi-Conductors, supra note 58, ¶ 96 (considering
the central question in the case as whether the administrative guidance of the
Japanese Government was, at its base, designed to constrain exports). The panel
found that the question of how such constraints were effected, either through
measures to restrict production for exports, or through measures restrict exports
themselves, were immaterial because it is the ultimate effect of the measures that is
considered critical under the GATT. Id. ¶¶ 114-17.
71. See id. ¶ 117 (concluding that the administrative structure created by the
Japanese government “operated to exert maximum possible pressure on the private
sector to cease exporting at prices below company-specific costs”).
72. See id. (finding that the Japanese government’s monitoring measures
violated Article XI because they “constituted a coherent system restricting the sale
for export of monitored semi-conductors”).
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XI. 73 OPEC influences the oil market using tactics that are clear for
the general public to observe and, in many ways, more restrictive and
controlling than those employed by Japan in Japan – Trade in SemiConductors. 74 OPEC’s widely recognized and acknowledged tactic
of curtailing production levels in direct response to declining prices
is precisely the type of activity prohibited by the holding of Japan –
Trade in Semi-Conductors. 75 Finding OPEC member countries in
violation of Article XI would, therefore, be entirely consistent with
previous panel decisions. 76

B. OPEC’S PRACTICES ARE PERMISSIBLE UNDER THE GATT
ARTICLE XX(G)
Article XX of the GATT lists General Exceptions to its provisions
that may be invoked in specific circumstances. 77 In general, it allows
nations to take legitimate measures necessary to guarantee a member
country’s best interests, so long as such measures are not disguised
attempts to circumvent the GATT rules. 78 Subsection (g) specifically
73. Cf. id. But see Broome, supra note 20, at 414 (arguing that the panel is
likely to interpret Article XI narrowly and therefore refuse to apply it to production
restrictions because production and exportation are different concepts).
74. Cf. Desta, supra note 14, at 533 (explaining that when the oil price falls
below a certain level, OPEC can seek a more desirable price through either export
levies or reductions in supply, and in practice it has used both, although it typically
prefers supply restrictions).
75. See id. at 534 (declaring that the GATT case law has found the type of
price-setting techniques used by OPEC to be in violation of Article XI).
76. But see Broome, supra note 20, at 418 (considering it likely that the WTO
Appellate Body would find that “production quotas are a step removed from export
restrictions because the export effect of a production restriction is only incidental
to the actual and intended effect” of preventing the oil from becoming a tradable
product). Prior to the production of the oil (i.e. extraction from its natural state and
further refinement), the author contends it cannot be characterized as a “product”
subject to the GATT. Id. at 418-19. To conclude otherwise may lead to a host of
other designs to circumvent Article XI’s prohibition on export controls. Id. at 418.
Similar restrictions on the development of raw materials and limitations on
production levels would practically eviscerate Article XI’s effectiveness. Id.
77. GATT, supra note 8, art. XX. See generally TREBILCOCK, supra note 15, at
30-35 (explaining briefly the general exceptions to the GATT obligations, and
other means by which WTO members can legitimately waive their obligations
under the GATT).
78. See GATT, supra note 8, art. XX (allowing members countries to adopt
certain measures otherwise contrary to provisions of the agreement, so long as
such measures are not used as “a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination,” or as “a disguised restriction on international trade”).
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addresses the exploitation of exhaustible natural resources, although
it does not specifically enumerate oil. 79
The Lautenberg Report dismisses Article XX(g) as an unviable
source of protection for OPEC’s policies for two reasons. 80 First, the
Lautenberg Report claims that an attempt by OPEC to invoke Article
XX(g) would amount to “a disguised restriction on international
trade” that is prohibited under the statute. 81 Second, it argues that
OPEC has never cited or relied upon the “conservation of natural
resources” as justification for its policies. 82
Prior GATT/WTO Panels have established that Article XX
enumerates limited and conditional exceptions from obligations
under other provisions of the GATT, and does not otherwise create
additional obligations for member countries to follow. 83 Parties
invoking Article XX as an affirmative defense bear the burden of
proof in justifying their exception under its provisions. 84 Parties may
invoke Article XX at their own discretion because its use as an
argument in the alternative is not construed as a de facto admission
79. Id. art. XX(g) (exempting measures “relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption”); see infra notes 91-94
and accompanying text (discussing case which referred to petroleum as an example
of an exhaustible natural resource).
80. See LAUTENBERG REPORT, supra note 20, at 6 (claiming OPEC cannot
invoke Article XX(g) because its exceptions are not intended for the type of
restrictive trade policies employed by OPEC).
81. See id. at 2-3 (insisting that exceptions to Article XI do not apply because
“OPEC’s stated goal is a price target, not conservation”).
82. See id. at 11 (acknowledging that crude oil is probably the kind of
exhaustible natural resource covered by Article XX(g), but arguing that because
OPEC has never claimed conservation as a justification, it has lost the ability to
successfully invoke Article XX(g) as an affirmative defense); see also GATT,
supra note 8, art. XX(g) (requiring that in order to invoke the exception, the
policies in question must be legitimate efforts to conserve natural resources, and
must be made “in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption”).
83. See United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, ¶¶ 2.1-3.9, DS21/R
(Sept. 3, 1991), GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) (1993) (considering a dispute brought
by Mexico over import restrictions on tuna imposed by the United States in
accordance with the enactment of the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972,
which sought to protect the dolphin population from the dangers of tuna fishing
operations, and therefore, per the United States, qualified as a measure aimed at
protecting a nonrenewable natural resource under the GATT Article XX(g)).
84. See id. ¶ 5.22 (adding that panels will not consider Article XX unless
specifically invoked by a party to a dispute).
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of guilt. 85 Therefore, despite the Lautenberg Report’s conclusion that
Article XX(g) does not excuse OPEC’s activities, there is no reason
to expect that OPEC member countries would refrain from asserting
Article XX(g) as an affirmative defense. 86
Assuming that OPEC would seek an Article XX general exception
if it were found in violation of Article XI, a WTO panel would apply
a multifaceted analysis to determine whether OPEC’s policies merit
a general exception. 87 The WTO Appellate Body Report in United
States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products
(“Shrimp Products Prohibition”) stated that measures seeking a
general exception under Article XX must first satisfy one of the
particular exceptions of sub-paragraphs (a) through (j). 88 Once a
State establishes provisional justification under one of the particular
exceptions, the panel evaluates the measure for compliance with the
introductory clause of Article XX which prohibits the invocation of
Article XX exceptions as a means of circumventing the GATT’s
overall purpose. 89

85. Id.
86. See Broome, supra note 20, at 419-34 (considering what defenses could
potentially be invoked if OPEC were found in violation of Article XI, including
Article XX(g), the Article XX(h) Commodity Agreements Exception, the Article
XXI National Security Exception, and Article XXXVIII, which permits
cooperative, intergovernmental arrangements intended to promote the interests of
developing countries).
87. See Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶¶ 116-122, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998)
[hereinafter Shrimp Products Prohibition] (declaring that for a measure to warrant
a general exception, it must both fall under one of the particular exceptions
contained in paragraphs (a) to (j), and must satisfy the requirements of the
introductory clause of Article XX, which forbids arbitrary or discriminatory
measures, as well as disguised barriers to trade). The panel in Shrimp Products
Prohibition also noted that Article XX terms should be interpreted in light of its
context and purpose. Id. ¶ 116.
88. Id. ¶ 69; see ¶¶ 164-65 (evaluating the legitimacy of U.S. import
restrictions on shrimp caught without the use of turtle excluder devices, which
protect endangered sea turtles from capture in shrimpers’ nets, and finding that
while the shrimp export ban is legitimately aimed at the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources, and therefore covered under Article XX(g), the ban
constitutes “arbitrary” and “unjustifiable” discrimination under the terms of Article
XX and thus the policy is not covered under the Article XX General Exceptions).
89. See GATT, supra note 8, art. XX (emphasizing in the opening section of
the article that the intention of the article is to preserve a proper level of national
sovereignty, but not at the risk of allowing surreptitious avoidance of the GATT
obligations); Shrimp Products Prohibition, supra note 88, ¶ 156 (expressing the
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OPEC’s methods are justified under the Article XX(g) exception
for exhaustible natural resources because the WTO Appellate Body
ruled in Shrimp Products Prohibition that petroleum is an
exhaustible natural resource under the terms of Article XX(g). 90 In
that case, the WTO Appellate Body considered whether a U.S. law
designed to protect sea turtles was justified as relating to an
exhaustible natural resource. 91 The panel found that the language of
Article XX(g) does not limit itself to non-living materials, since
living resources are just as finite as petroleum, minerals, and other
inanimate materials. 92 By highlighting petroleum as a definitively
finite, and thus exhaustible natural resource, the body explicitly
underscored the applicability of Article XX(g) to petroleum and
policies affecting trade in petroleum. 93
After finding OPEC’s measures covered by Article XX(g), a WTO
panel will next assess the measures’ justifiability under the
introductory language of Article XX, which is concerned mainly
with the manner in which policies are implemented and seeks to
prevent abuses of Article XX’s general exceptions. 94 Prior
GATT/WTO Panel and Appellate Body rulings on Article XX have
established that its exceptions must be construed narrowly to keep
parties from seeking a broader range of exceptions than originally
intended under the statute. 95 For example, in the 1996 United States
fundamental principle that the introductory language of Article XX exists both to
guarantee a level of domestic sovereignty for member countries, and prevent the
abuse of Article XX’s exceptions).
90. See Shrimp Products Prohibition, supra note 87, ¶ 128 (reaching a
conclusion on whether natural resources were limited to non-living resources and,
in concluding that they are not, implicitly holding that petroleum is a classic
example of an exhaustible natural resource under Article XX).
91. Id. ¶ 127.
92. See id. ¶ 128 (finding that “[t]extually, Article XX(g) is not limited to the
conservation of ‘mineral’ or ‘non-living’ natural resources . . . . Living resources
are just as ‘finite’ as petroleum, iron ore and other non-living resources”)
(emphasis in original).
93. See id. ¶ 129 (asserting that one must interpret the language of Article
XX(g) in consideration of the “contemporary concerns” of the international
community for environmental protection measures).
94. Cf. id. ¶ 37 (noting that the object and purpose of the introductory language
of Article XX is to prevent abuses of the article’s general exceptions, and thus
preserve the parties’ overall commitments to the GATT).
95. See, e.g., Panel Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, ¶¶ 6.1-6.10, WT/DS2/AB/R, (Jan. 29, 1996) [hereinafter
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline] (considering a dispute
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– Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline
(“Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline”) case, a
WTO Panel set a high standard for exceptions, finding that policies
inconsistent with the GATT must be “necessary” to achieving the
member country’s stated policy goals in order to justify an Article
XX exception. 96 Under that holding, the term “necessary” was
interpreted as covering policies enacted as a last resort, in situations
where no other reasonably available policies existed that were either
consistent with the GATT, or less inconsistent than the policy in
question. 97
OPEC’s policies meet this standard because production quotas are
less inconsistent with the GATT Article XI prohibitions than direct
export controls. 98 The goal of OPEC’s production quotas is to control
the exploitation of petroleum, an exhaustible natural resource. 99 By
controlling oil exploitation through production and not directly
though export control, OPEC’s tactics are less inconsistent with
Article XI than other reasonably available policies, and thus meet the
threshold established in Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline of a necessary policy that merits a general
exception under Article XX. 100
related to the implementation of the Clean Air Act of 1990 by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency and efforts to control pollution caused by the
combustion of gasoline manufactured in or imported into the United States, the
panel concluded that the United States’ policies treated imported gasoline less
favorably than domestic gasoline).
96. See id. ¶ 6.20 (underscoring that a party asserting Article XX as an
affirmative defense must prove three factors to merit a general exception: (1) the
policy in question aims toward achieving an objective allowed under Article XX,
(2) the policy is necessary to achieving that goal, and (3) the policy conforms with
the introductory clause of Article XX, which prohibits measures implemented as
“disguised” restrictions on trade and arbitrary or discriminatory measures).
97. See id. ¶ 6.24 (highlighting that past panels examining questionable
measures under Article XX considered the availability of alternate measures that
were either fully consistent or “less inconsistent” with the GATT, in order to judge
the necessity of the policies in question).
98. Cf. GATT, supra note 8, art. XI (prohibiting export controls but making no
explicit mention of a prohibition on production quotas).
99. See OPEC Statute, supra note 25, art. 2 (declaring that the principal aim of
the organization is the coordination of petroleum policies of member countries to
ensure, among other things, “an efficient, economic and regular supply of
petroleum”); Shrimp Products Prohibition, supra note 88, ¶ 128 (indicating that
petroleum, as a finite, non-living natural resource, qualifies as an exhaustible
natural resource under the terms of the GATT Article XX(g)).
100. See Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, supra note 96,

806

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[24:785

The question remains whether OPEC’s policies qualify as
measures relating to conservation. 101 The Lautenberg Report finds
without elaboration that because OPEC member countries have never
cited conservation as a motivating factor in their decisions, the
exception is not available to them. 102 The main issue is whether
OPEC’s decisions to adjust production levels, which are made
strictly in relation to price fluctuations, are considered “relating to”
conservation under the meaning of Article XX(g). 103
Self-determination over a country’s own natural resources is a
bedrock principle of international law that will factor into a panel’s
analysis of OPEC’s oil production controls. 104 A shift is already well
underway in the WTO toward greater deference for environmental
concerns. 105 A panel would thus likely find that the contracting

¶ 6.22 (asserting that the WTO does not examine the necessity of the policy goal,
but rather determines whether the policies in question are necessary to achieve the
goal sought, assuming that aim is allowable under Article XX paragraphs (b) – (j)).
In the Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline case, the WTO
addressed whether or not the policy goal in question was for the protection and
promotion of clean air, which the panel found to be an exhaustible natural resource
within the meaning of Article XX(g), and allowable as protecting human, animal,
or plant life or health under Article XX(b). Id. ¶¶ 6.21, 6.36.
101. See GATT, supra note 8, art. XX(g) (excepting measures relating to
conservation “if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions
on domestic production or consumption”); see also Desta, supra note 15, at 536
(recognizing petroleum to be an exhaustible natural resource but questioning if
OPEC’s production restrictions qualify as conservation measures since it instituted
them largely in response to price fluctuations).
102. LAUTENBERG REPORT, supra note 20, at 11.
103. See Desta, supra note 14, at 536 (noting the important distinction between
finding an overall policy of manipulating production levels as a legitimate
conservation measure, versus OPEC’s specific policy of manipulating production
levels based on changing prices).
104. See Franz Xaver Perrez, The Relationship Between “Permanent
Sovereignty” and the Obligation Not to Cause Transboundary Environmental
Damage, 26 ENVTL. L. 1187, 1191 (1996) (interpreting United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) as granting an ‘“inherent and overriding right’
of a state to control the exploitation and the use of its natural resources,” so long as
its use reflects the best interests of its people).
105. See generally Steve Charnowitz, The WTO’s Environmental Progress, 10 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 685 (2007) (studying developments in the interaction between
environment and trade at the WTO and concluding that WTO actions will continue
a trend toward greater attention to issues of environmental protection). Not only
will the WTO sustain recent panel decisions sympathetic to the environment, the
next round of WTO amendments will also likely include a number of strengthened
environmental provisions. Id. at 705-06.
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parties intended specifically for Article XX(g) to protect sovereignty
over natural resources, regardless of whether OPEC member
countries advertise their policies as relating to conservation. 106
Furthermore, the language of Article XX(g) specifically tolerates
conservation measures taken in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production, which is precisely what OPEC’s policies
accomplish. 107 Because its oil production policies aimed at the export
market are equivalent to those for domestic consumption, a panel
could not find them arbitrary or discriminatory, nor could they find
them unrelated to domestic conservation or production policies. 108

III. RECOMMENDATIONS
The United States should not pursue a WTO dispute settlement
against OPEC member countries because such a strategy would not
yield positive results. 109 Those concerned with rising energy prices
and who seek to liberalize the energy trade are better served by
bringing OPEC member countries into greater harmony with the
GATT/WTO framework, not driving them away. 110 Instead of
dispute resolution a new round of negotiations should be initiated to
better incorporate energy trade within the WTO. 111
106. See Broome, supra note 20, at 424-25 (discussing the likelihood of a
successful Article XX(g) defense by OPEC and finding strong support for that
defense in the notion of permanent sovereignty).
107. Cf. GATT, supra note 8, art. XX(g).
108. See Desta, supra note 14, at 537 (finding that OPEC’s policies are covered
by Article XX(g)’s requirement that measures be taken in conjunction with
domestic efforts even though most of OPEC members’ oil is exported). Ultimately,
if challenged and found to be legitimately related to conservation, OPEC and its
policies would not fail under Article XX(g)'s domestic production or consumption
requirement. Id.
109. See supra notes 78-109 and accompanying text (arguing that a WTO
dispute settlement against OPEC member countries would not result in the
elimination of OPEC’s influence over global oil markets because, as an exhaustible
natural resource, the general exception under the GATT Article XX(g) allows
controls on the export of petroleum).
110. See infra notes 121-34 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits to
be gained from closer collaboration between OPEC member countries and the
WTO, including more effective regulation, improved market access, and better
economic growth).
111. See generally Sakmar, supra note 3 (evaluating proposals to effectively
bring the energy trade into the WTO and concluding that continued uncertainty and
volatility in energy markets will encourage the United States and the European
Union to push for more comprehensive rules to govern the trade of energy).

808

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[24:785

A. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT PURSUE WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT AGAINST OPEC
WTO dispute resolution against OPEC is not a legitimate solution
for escalating energy prices because there is a substantial likelihood
such a challenge would fail due to Article XX’s general
exceptions. 112 On a more practical note, current reports indicate that
the world’s oil producers are already operating at or very near
maximum capacity, and that supply is actually growing faster than
demand. 113 Going forward with an attack on these nations’
sovereignty over their main source of revenue and primary
mechanism for achieving greater economic opportunity would
degrade regional stability among oil producing nations and produce
negative long-term national security implications for many of the
world’s developed nations. 114 Even a successful challenge could have
negative repercussions, such as a precedent allowing trading partners
to force one another to eliminate any measure that prevented an
industry from operating at maximum capacity. 115
There is also a legitimate issue as to how much a WTO challenge
would antagonize and further marginalize OPEC member
countries. 116 Virtually all of the thirteen countries that comprise
112. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (arguing that the GATT
Article XX(g) exception, for measures aimed at exhaustible natural resources,
covers OPEC’s policies aimed at regulating oil exports among its member
countries, in part because a WTO panel asserted in the Shrimp Products
Prohibition case that petroleum is a “finite” resource covered under the definition
of exhaustible natural resources used in Article XX(g)).
113. See Saudis May Be Strapped for Oil, Close to Full Capacity, CNBC.COM,
June 16, 2008, http://www.cnbc.com/id/25179997 (reporting that Saudi Arabia’s
ability to boost output past 9.45 million barrels per day, as promised in June 2008,
may not be possible); World has enough oil supplies for ‘many decades’: Nuaimi,
AFP, June 22, 2008, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5i2J6Q6UEMfsPHEDBP4VacV9mGEg (quoting Saudi Arabian Oil Minister Ali al-Nuaimi as saying that
oil demand is at approximately 1.2 billion barrels per day, while global oil supplies
have risen to 1.4 to 1.6 billion barrels per day).
114. See generally Desta, supra note 14 (finding that challenging OPEC
member countries under the market-access framework of the WTO cannot provide
a lasting solution to the problem of energy trade).
115. See Broome, supra note 20, at 418 (quoting former USTR Robert Zoellick
as saying that measures aimed at preventing an industry from operating at full
capacity “would be like someone coming to the United States and saying we must
dig up more of this metal or that metal or produce more of this or that product”).
116. See Desta, supra note 14, at 550 (recommending more engagement, not
less, between the WTO and OPEC member countries); cf. LAUTENBERG REPORT,
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OPEC have some history of serious instability or conflict, and
virtually all remain developing countries, where economic growth
has tended to lag. 117 For many, their GATT/WTO membership marks
a robust effort to expand international relations while improving
conditions for economic growth and future development. 118 Using
this platform as a means to attack their prime source of economic
capacity would seriously discourage these countries from further
integration into the global economic system. 119

B. OIL EXPORTING NATIONS AND ENERGY CONSUMERS SHOULD
JOINTLY DEVELOP A NEW MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK FOR
MANAGING THE GLOBAL ENERGY TRADE
Rather than pursuing reactionary policies aimed at short-term
consumer satisfaction, policymakers’ efforts are better directed at
conceiving a more workable framework under well-known and
successful multilateral trading principles. 120 At its inception at the
close of World War II, the dual goals of the GATT were to foster
conditions for new levels of economic growth and prosperity among
its member countries and to prevent another world war by creating

supra note 21, at 12 (making no mention of the security and development
implications that WTO dispute settlement against OPEC could bring).
117. See, e.g., CIA, The World Factbook – Angola, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ao.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2009)
(considering Angola a “rebuilding” nation after 27 years of civil war ended in
2002); CIA, The World Factbook – Libya, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2009)
(explaining that Libya’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism was removed in
June 2006).
118. See Sonia E. Rolland, Developing Country Coalitions at the WTO: In
Search of Legal Support, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 484, 487 (2007) (noting that
developing countries who joined the GATT in the 1970s were significantly
motivated by the promotion of economic development on a broader scale than
offered by the typical East-West alliances arising from the Cold War political
dynamic).
119. See Desta, supra note 14, at 550 (recommending that OPEC countries
should be encouraged to join the WTO because it would promote their integration
into a structured system of rules, as well as allow them to reap the benefits of
global investment, increase their access to foreign markets, and facilitate their
ability to influence global environmental rules).
120. See Sakmar, supra note 3, at 111 (suggesting that “while the [Energy
Charter Treaty] and the WTO have laid the foundation for countries to address the
trade-related aspects of energy, the rules need to evolve to address energy trade
more comprehensively”).

810

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[24:785

conditions of mutual accommodation and respect that would reduce
the likelihood of wide-scale armed conflict. 121 Recent history
indicates that the GATT has been largely successful on both
fronts. 122 However, if there is a single commodity prone to creating
conflict, it is oil. 123 Not only would an improved trading framework
alleviate the risk of conflict by bringing more oil producers under a
system of rules, it would allow acceding countries the benefits they
seek in terms of new investment and better market access. 124
There is widespread support for developments aimed at freer trade
in energy services and major energy importers and exporters have
already requested that the WTO make liberalized energy trade a
priority in future negotiations. 125 Such negotiations should
specifically acknowledge that the need for policies designed to
control the rate of oil production are necessary to ensure a nation’s
sovereignty over environmental protection and natural resources. 126
The WTO has explicitly declared that requiring a showing of
“necessity” for oil production controls would achieve that purpose
and also maintain the safeguards against Article XX abuses. 127

121. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (discussing the history and
purpose of the GATT); see also Jackson, supra note 17, at 67-68 (exploring the
current state of the world trading system with emphasis on proposed developments
and reforms); Broome, supra note 20, at 435 (finding that a reading of Article XI
that allows one WTO member “to force another to produce more of its natural
resources to satisfy world demand” probably goes further than the intended limits
of Article XI).
122. See Jackson, supra note 16, at 68 (noting that by one measure—avoidance
of another world war—the GATT has been successful); supra Part I.B.
123. Desta, supra note 14, at 549.
124. See id. at 550 (presenting advantages to the accession of OPEC members to
the WTO).
125. See Sakmar, supra note 3, at 104-05 (citing a collective request to the WTO
from several major energy importers and exporters seeking freer energy trade
among a “target group” of developing nations).
126. See supra note 90 (inferring the intent to preserve members’ sovereignty
over natural resources from the introductory language to Article XX). But see
LAUTENBERG REPORT, supra note 20, at 2 (making no mention of environmental
utility of OPEC's oil production controls, and viewing them only as a method to
control prices).
127. See Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, supra note 95,
¶¶ 6.20-6.24 (considering the necessity of inconsistent measures, and finding that
measures deemed unnecessary do not warrant general exceptions under Article
XX).
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C. THE FOCUS SHOULD BE ON STABILIZING ENERGY MARKETS,
INCENTIVIZING CONSERVATION, AND IMPROVING ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN OIL EXPORTING NATIONS
Critical to the success of a new framework for managing the
global energy trade is recognizing the unique nature of the
commodities involved and the rapidly changing nature of the
marketplace. 128 At the forefront of global energy concern is the need
for stable sources of energy at stable prices.129 Thus far, the WTO
system has proven ineffective at providing consistency and
predictability in global energy markets. 130
A new multilateral energy trading policy at the WTO should
embody the goals of improving development opportunities for oil
exporting countries, encouraging multilateral conservation,
developing new technologies, and ultimately limiting the market
forces that lead to drastic and detrimental price fluctuations in energy
markets. 131 A successful strategy would focus on building the
capacity for investment and trade in other sectors within oil
exporting nations. 132 Such a policy would both reduce oil exporting

128. See generally Saint Petersburg Summit 2006, Global Energy Security, ¶¶ 2,
7, 10, June 3, 2006, available at http://peopleandplanet.org/dl/climate/
g8_energy_security.pdf [hereinafter Global Energy Summit] (identifying current
global energy challenges, including potential political instability in some major oil
producing nations and the vulnerability of the global energy infrastructure to manmade calamity and natural disasters and highlighting the need to pursue
comprehensive energy security policies that embody the goals of preventing
climate change, while promoting clean energy and sustainable development).
129. See id. ¶ 1 (considering an affordable supply of environmentally-sound
constant, plentiful, reliable, and secure energy resources as a key factor in
continued development worldwide).
130. See Sakmar, supra note 3, at 95-96 (noting that during the early GATT
negotiations, participating states seemed to have a “gentlemen’s agreement”
whereby they avoided discussion of petroleum trade issues).
131. See Global Energy Summit, supra note 128, ¶ 1 (highlighting the critical
components of a successful and progressive energy policy). See generally Sakmar,
supra note 3 (forecasting the likelihood of new rules governing the energy trade at
the WTO and suggesting that the possibility of a new regime will continue to
increase as market forces continue to elevate the importance of issues of energy
security).
132. See Broome, supra note 20, at 435-36 (identifying the benefits of the WTO
membership to OPEC countries and stressing the importance of the diversification
of their economies).
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nations’ reliance on high oil prices, and alleviate their growing
concerns over diminishing consumer demand for oil worldwide. 133

CONCLUSION
The solution to 2008’s dramatic and unprecedented escalation in
oil prices is not WTO dispute settlement against OPEC member
countries. 134 While OPEC’s policies likely violate the GATT Article
XI prohibition on quantitative export restrictions, there is ample
precedent for finding them permissible under the GATT Article
XX(g) General Exception for measures affecting exhaustible natural
resources, such as oil. 135 Therefore, a preferred strategy for
improving and liberalizing the flow of oil in international markets is
to develop a new framework for managing the energy trade within
the WTO that better acknowledges and accommodates the needs of
oil producers and consumers. 136

133. See generally Adam Schreck, Oil off $3; Regulators Blame Demand for
Run-Up, USATODAY.COM, July 22, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/
money/industries/energy/2008-07-22-oil-tuesday_N.htm (reporting new evidence
that high oil prices are eliminating consumer demand, especially in the United
States, where gasoline demand dropped for thirteen weeks in a row).
134. See Broome, supra note 20, at 435-36 (explaining that a WTO suit brought
against OPEC by the United States could ultimately create a conflict of interest for
countries that are both party to OPEC and the WTO and that given that the two
organizations provide differing advantages for countries that are members to both,
forcing them to choose is not ideal).
135. See supra notes 77-108 and accompanying text (exploring past WTO panel
decisions and the extent to which precedent informs how a panel would interpret
OPEC’s activities).
136. See generally Sakmar, supra note 3 (examining the driving factors behind
the development of a new energy trading framework at the WTO, the most
prominent of which is a heightened need for energy security).

